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Radio Frequency (RF) devices produce some amount of Unintended Electro-
magnetic Emissions (UEEs). UEEs are generally unique to a device and can be
thought of as a signature of the device. This property of uniqueness of UEEs can
be used to detect and identify the device producing the emission. The problem with
UEEs is that they are very low in power and are often buried deep inside the noise
band which makes them dicult to detect. There are two types of UEE detection
methods. The rst one is called stimulated detection method where the UEEs of a
device are enhanced using external stimulation signal and the detection is made based
on the analysis of the enhanced stimulated signal. This method, however, is resource
intensive as the generation, transmission, and reception of the stimulation signal re-
quires hardware components. The second UEE detection method is called passive
detection method where the UEE signals are not tampered with and are analyzed
in its original raw form. Since the UEEs are weak in strength, the challenge with
passive detection method is to measure and analyze UEEs in a noisy environment.
In order to detect and recognize RF devices through the UEE, the rst step is
to measure the leakage of electric signal that is emitted outside of the RF devices as
UEEs. UEE samples are collected from two RF devices at three dierent distances
of 3 feet, 6 feet and 10 feet and also for noise in a similar environment. The three
methods explored in this research are Principal Components Analysis (PCA), Hidden
Markov Model (HMM), and Support Vector Machine (SVM). This research studies
the performance of these three algorithms for passive detection of UEEs and compares
it with the performance of Neural Network (NN). The explored methods gives signif-
icant better results than existing methods and can be used as an alternative for the
costly and resource intensive stimulated detection methods. One of the major appli-
cation of UEE is in the detection of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). Eective
IED detection system for military operation should accurately perform the task of
detection, localization, and direction of malicious devices. This research contributes
to the detection and recognition of IED detection system by proposing models based
on stochastic and computational intelligence methods. These methods proved to
have promise if it can be implemented in real life with more applied research.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The number of wireless devices available has grown substantially during the last
few decades. Nowhere is this growth more evident than in the growth of mobile/cel-
lular phone subscribers. Figure 1.1 illustrates the increase in the number of mobile
subscriptions in the United States per 100 people from 1984 to 2012 [1]. Less than
1% of the United States population had a mobile phone in 1984; eleven years later,
that number had reached 10%. The number of subscribers has grown exponentially
thereafter, reaching almost 100% in 2012. People use a variety of wireless devices
in their daily lives. These include headphones, speakers, computer keyboards, com-
puter mouses, printers, garage door openers, and Global Positioning System (GPS)
receivers. The sale of wireless devices has grown with their use. An example of this
growth can be seen in the sales of GPS receivers. GPS receivers are wireless devices
that can calculate the position and velocity of objects based on the signals received
from the GPS satellite system [2]. There were 69 million GPS receiver units sold
in 2005 alone. These sales increased to over 122 million in 2010 [4]. It is estimated
that one billion GPS enabled devices will be sold in 2014 [3].
The growth of wireless technology will likely continue in the future as many
non-wireless devices are currently being built to have wireless capabilities. Many
traditional accessories (e.g., watches and spectacles) have some wireless features em-
bedded within them. The use of wireless technology in jewelry has been around for
decades. Common examples include an embedded microphone on a necklace and
earphone in earrings [5]. Several automobile companies have begun to provide high
speed 4G LTE in vehicles [6]. The tremendous growth of wireless devices has made
them ubiquitous in modern society, and this growth is not expected to slow down in
the immediate future.
Wireless technology has improved the quality of life in many ways. The prolifer-
ation of wireless devices has enabled people to connect and communicate with almost
anyone wherever and whenever they want. For example, the Himalayan region, an
2Figure 1.1 Mobile Cellular Subscriptions in US (per 100 people)
area considered one of the most remote places on the planet, is now connected to the
rest of the world through wireless devices [7].
Wireless devices are incredibly useful in the relief operations during a natural
disaster. Wireless devices are particularly useful during specic operations like lo-
cating, tracking, and providing immediate relief to the victims [8]. For example,
after an earthquake, searching for victims beneath collapsed structure such as build-
ings and bridges is very risky. There is a signicant risk that the rescue operation
will further destabilize the structure causing more fatalities amongst trapped victims
or the relief worker themselves. In this type of scenario, the robots with wireless
signal transmitter makes the relief operation safer and ecient. Small robots with
audio and video sensors with wireless signal transmitter can explore the remains of
collapsed structures and send information about the location and condition of the
victims [9] and [10].
Wireless telemedicine is another useful application of wireless technology. Wire-
less telemedicine is a fast and eective method to provide clinical health care to
patients located at a dierent geographical location from the health care providers
[11]. Telemedicine system generally consists of two units. The rst unit is a mobile
unit that is located near the patient. It transmits vital information about the patient
such as electrocardiogram, pulse rate, etc. The second unit is called the consulta-
3tion unit that is located with the health care expert. The consultation unit receives
information from mobile unit. Based on the information received, the health care ex-
pert diagnose the medical condition of the patient and give directions for treatment.
These directions are implemented by medical sta located near the mobile unit [12].
Another similar application of wireless devices in medicine includes the real time and
continuous home monitoring of chronic and elderly patients [13]. Wireless technol-
ogy enables the monitoring of the health condition of such patients continuously and
in near real-time when the patient is at home. This reduces the medical cost of the
patient as they don't have to pay for the costly medical bills of hospital stay [14].
These examples illustrates that the wireless technology has made this world a better
place to live.
As the saying goes that every coin has its other side, no matter how useful
wireless technology has become, there will always be some drawbacks. For example,
the increasing worldwide use of wireless devices has created an extensive amount
of electromagnetic pollution [15]. It is dicult to nd an open area in the planet
without some amount of electromagnetic radiation. It is not completely known how
harmful this electromagnetic pollution is to the human health. Some preliminary
studies are suggesting negative health eects of such exposure [16]. Preliminary
results suggests a link between extensive usage of wireless devices cause minor health
issues such as sleep depravation and headache to major health concerns like cancer
[17]. Not only human beings, but plants and animals are also subjected to the
negative eects of electromagnetic pollution [18]. A study by Irmak et. al (2002)
observed the negative eect of electromagnetic radiation on rabbits. They observed
an increase in the stress levels in the animals under study [19].
Interference is another negative consequence of electromagnetic pollution. In-
terference is the undesired functioning of an electronic circuit due to an unwanted
external electromagnetic signal being conducted through the device [20]. Electro-
magnetic interference has been found to cause medical equipment malfunction [21].
Mobile phones are not allowed inside intensive care unit of hospitals as the interfer-
ence of electromagnetic radiation from the mobile phone with the medical equipment
4may be fatal for the patients [22]. For example, a pacemaker, which is a medical
device placed in the heart of a patient to control the heart rate is prone to exter-
nal interference. Interference of external electromagnetic signals have been found to
alter the basic functions of the pacemaker, sometimes causing adverse eects to the
patient [23]. One of the adverse eect of interference of cell phone on pacemaker
is the oversensing eect (pacemaker tracking an increase in the heart-beat rate of
the patient when the heart-beat rate is normal) causing the pacemaker to lower the
heart-beat rate of the patient [24].
Furthermore, some places completely restrict the use of wireless devices due
to security and privacy concerns. Examples of such places are customs oces and
courthouses, which prohibit the use of wireless devices as these devices may be used
to illegally record or interrupt the proceedings [25]. In some extreme cases, wireless
devices are used as weapons to inict physical damage to others. In such cases, it
is very dicult to control or avoid the use of wireless devices. An example of such
usage of wireless technology in a malicious manner is Improvised Explosive Devices
(IEDs). IEDs are homemade explosive devices made from easily available, low cost
and legally available raw materials such as inorganic salts and peroxides that are
compounds generally found in commercially available fertilizers [26]. A picture of an
IED is depicted in Figure 1.2 [27]. The picture shows an IED where a walkie talkie
is connected to explosive materials through a wire. The purpose of wireless device is
to remotely detonate the IED. There are two methods to detonate an IED. First, is
to wire the explosive material to the RF receiver directly. A call is then made to that
walkie talkie, which acts as an detonator. Secondly, a timer is set using the internal
alarm of the RF receiver. The IED will detonate when the alarm is triggered [28].
IEDs were the primary cause of a large number of coalition fatalities during the
Afghanistan and Iraq war. Figure 1.3 illustrates the number of coalition fatalities in
Afghanistan and the number of those fatalities attributed to IEDs. It can be observed
in the gure that a large number of deaths is caused by the IEDs. Table 1.1 further
claries the fact that IEDs are the major weapons used by the terrorists against
coalition forces. IEDs caused 40.75% of the total deaths of the coalition fatalities
5Figure 1.2 Improvised Explosive Device (adapted from commons:wikimedia:org)
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from 2001 to 2013. If it is somehow possible to detect IEDs present nearby, the
number of deaths can be signicantly reduced not only in Afghanistan, but in other
hostile environments where this form of warfare exists. It can thus be concluded that
detection and localization of RF receivers in a hostile territory could be an eective
approach to reduce the number of fatalities.
One way of controlling undesired and illegal usage of wireless electronic devices
6is to detect them while they are inactive. The identication and detection of wireless
devices in prohibited areas will help to minimize their harmful eects and/or conse-
quences. Security ocers like a baili in a court room can determine if there is an
illegal use of devices occuring. Army personnel can identify and locate IEDs in an
area and safely deactivate it before it can cause harm. There are dierent methods
for detecting devices. The following paragraphs discuss two of the most common de-
vice detection methods in use today: radio frequency identication (RFID) method
and bug scanning method.
RFID is one of the most commonly used methods for device detection and
identication. RFID is a method that enables the automatic identication of physical
objects through the use of radio signals. RFID consists of two parts, which are a
tag and a reader. The tag consists of a small microchip that can store information
and is capable of wireless data transmission [29]. The reader can detect the tag
by reading the information that is transmitted by the tag [30]. The major reason
for the popularity of RFID is its low cost. RFID are used by large and well known
companies and organizations such as Wal Mart, Procter and Gamble, and the United
States Department of Defense in a wide variety of products, further increasing its
popularity [29], [31]. One of the requirements of RFID is that the object that is to
be detected has to have a unique tag. This requirement restricts the use of RFID
as a device detection method in many cases. For example, to use RFID method to
detect IED, the tag of the RFID has to be attached to IED, which is not possible.
Bug scanning is another common method used for the detection of electronic
devices. In the bug scanning method, the device that is to be detected is exposed
by an external source of strong electromagnetic radiation and the re-emitted electro-
magnetic radiation is analyzed for the detection process [32]. Bug scanning is capable
of detecting any device that contains PN junction. A PN junction is the area of a
semiconductor where two types semiconductor materials are joined together. If a
PN junction is present in the electronic device, the junction will cause the stimulated
signal to bounce back with its harmonics and the presence of this reected harmonics
signies the presence of electronic devices [33]. Seguin (2009) has pointed two major
7drawbacks of this method that causes serious limitations in its application for device
detection. Firstly, not only PN junction, but dierent types of junctions including
metal junctions will rectify the stimulated signal. This, in turn, increases the false
positive rates of detection to an unacceptable level as even a simple metal junction
such as a rusty nail will be classied as an electronic device. Secondly, the electro-
magnetic signals that are re-emitted are extremely weak in power. This low power
signal is dicult to capture and measure [32]. The power of the re-emitted signal can
be increased by using a very strong stimulation signal. However, the strong stimu-
lation signal increases the false positive rates by interacting with many more metal
junctions within surroundings. Due to these disadvantages, bug scanning method
have serious limitations in IED detection. The drawbacks of RFID method and the
bug scanning methods makes those methods unsuitable for IED detection. Thus,
there is a need for robust IED detection and recognition methods.
The primary purpose of Systems Engineering is to bring a system into existence
that satises the need of the customer. Eective IED detection system for a military
operation should accurately perform the tasks of detection, localization, and direc-
tion of malicious device at a long distance. This research contributes to the detection
aspect of the overall IED detection system by exploring various stochastic and com-
putational intelligence methods based on the leakage of electromagnetic signals from
electronic device components. It also contributes to the passive detection approach
of malicious devices by proposing methods that are capable of not only detection but
also of recognition. The proposed methods has a potential of being implemented in
real life applications of military operations of IED detection system.
The next section will introduce Unintended Electromagnetic Emissions (UEEs)
and explain how it can be used for IED detection. It will discuss the generation and
characteristics of UEE and explain the challenges associated with UEE detection and
recognition.
82. UNINTENDED ELECTROMAGNETIC EMISSIONS
All electronic devices emit some form of electromagnetic radiation. Electronic
devices with any kind of electronic circuits or which work at RF frequencies emit some
amount of Unintended Electromagnetic Emissions (UEEs) [34]. These emissions are
generated by the signals created by a local oscillator within an integrated circuit. As
an example, a circuit diagram of a local oscillator is reproduced in Figure 2.3 [35].
In this gure, Q denotes a transistor, L denotes an inductor, C1 and C2 denotes
the two capacitors, and, RL and REE denotes the two resistors. The local oscillator
emit electromagnetic signals which couple with device's antenna, connection wires,
or housing of the device and are radiated outside the device as UEEs [36], [37]. An
example of an UEE signal is shown in Figure 2.1. The Figure consists of amplitude
in dBm plotted against 1001 data points. Each data point represent a frequency
that are 20 Hz apart. The details of the data collection process for the UEE signal
is explained in Section 4.1.2. An increase in the power in the UEE signal can be
observed around the central frequency, which is denoted by a shadowed area with
dotted lines in Figure 2.1. Figure 2.2 shows both an UEE signal and a noise signal
to illustrate the dierence between them. In the case of the UEE signal, a signicant
increase in power can be observed between 450 and 550 data points. But the dierence
in noise is that there are many non-signicant but random increases in power within
the signal trace. A consistent but signicant increase in power is a feature of UEE
that helps us to detect UEEs from the ambient noise. As the magnitude of increase
in power in UEEs, and the range within which increase in power occurs is dierent
for dierent devices, UEEs can also be used for device recognition. The challenge in
UEE detection and recognition, however, is that the increase in power is low and the
range within which an increase in power occurs is small. In addition, UEEs are often
buried in the ambient noise band. The method of UEE detection and recognition
should be robust enough to overcome these challenges.
The characteristics of the UEEs depend upon the conguration and charac-
9Figure 2.1 Unintended Electromagnetic Emission from a walkie talkie radio
teristics of the various components of the electronic device emitting the UEEs [38].
There always exist some dierences between various internal electronics components
such as resistors and transistors between dierent devices. The main reason of the
dierence between these components is due to the fact that the tolerance of the com-
ponents are dierent for dierent devices. Tolerance of any component can be dened
as the variation allowed for that component. For example, a 1K 
 resistor with a
tolerance of 10% can be expected to measure between 900 
 and 1100 
 whereas
a 1K 
 resistor with a tolerance of 2% can be expected to measure between 980 

and 1020 
. Let us now take the example of the oscillator illustrated in Figure 2.3.
There may be dierent devices that use the oscillators with exactly the same circuit
design as in Figure 2.3. But the characteristics of the oscillators will dier between
dierent devices due to the operating values and the tolerances of these electronic
components. Since the combination of the characteristics of these components are
unique, the characteristics of the UEEs generated by these devices will also be unique.
This uniqueness feature of UEEs can reveal valuable information about a particular
electronic device [37]. UEEs can thus be taken as a unique signature of electronic
devices that can be used for device detection and identication.
In this research, the attention is focussed on the UEEs from Radio Frequency
(RF) devices. Typical RF devices have either superheterodyne or super-regenerative
receivers (SRR) [39]. The superheterodyne receiver architecture was invented by
Edwin Armstrong in 1918. This architecture is popular since it allows the RF signal
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Figure 2.2 UEE and Noise Signal
to be converted down to a xed lower Intermediate Frequency (IF), replacing a low
Q tunable RF lter with a low cost high Q-IF lter [40]. A block diagram of a
superheterodyne receiver is illustrated in Figure 2.4. The energy generated by the
local oscillator is intended to be used only within the receiver. However, in practice,
some amount of this energy usually escapes into the environment resulting in UEEs
[41] [42].
As illustrated in the block diagram of a SRR in Figure 2.5, there is a feedback
in the SRR which connects the output of the receiver to the input. The purpose of the
quench generator is to periodically interrupt the main RF oscillation [43]. Ideally, all
of the energy generated by this quench generator should be absorbed by the receiver.
In reality, however, some leakage occurs in this process and some amount of energy
generated by the quench generator is emitted as UEEs [39].
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Figure 2.3 Local Oscillator
Figure 2.4 Block Diagram of Superheterodyne Receiver
Figure 2.5 Block Diagram of Super Regenerative Receiver
Detection of RF receivers using their UEEs at a signicant distance is dicult
due to the high levels of ambient noise [32]. Another diculty arises due to the fact
that the power of the UEEs are weak and also varies according to the receiver model
and year [40]. The challenge is to detect the low power, variable strength UEE signals
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which are deeply buried within the ambient noise band. The next section will discuss
some of the methods of detection of these signals found in the current literature. It
will highlight the most relevant approaches to identify, detect, and recognize UEE
signals from every day wireless devices.
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3. BACKGROUND
This section discusses the most common detection and recognition methods
associated with UEEs that are available in the current literature. Detection is the
process of distinguishing UEEs from ambient noise in a specic frequency band,
whereas, recognition is the process of distinguishing between multiple sources of UEEs
in a specic frequency band. The methods of detection and recognition of UEEs can
be further classied into two types: stimulated detection and passive detection.
In the stimulated detection methods, the underlying characteristics of UEE is
strengthened and stabilized by an external stimulation signal. Stimulation detection
method is based on the fact that the characteristics of the UEEs become more consis-
tent when subjected to an appropriate external RF stimulation. External simulation
not only improves the quality of the UEEs, but also helps in consistent receival of
the UEEs. Receiving a consistent UEEs is important in detection as UEEs are of-
ten buried in the noise band and are sometimes even below the ambient noise level.
The stimulation signal increases the intensity of the low power UEE signal and also
enables the steady ow of the consistent signal, thus making it easier for detection.
Unlike stimulated detection of UEEs, the UEEs in the passive detection meth-
ods are not tampered with and are analyzed in their raw form [43], [32]. The challenge
of passive detection is that UEEs are low in power and it makes it dicult to detect
and analyze the UEEs in a noisy environment. This section will discuss the com-
mon methods available in literature for both stimulated and passive detection and
recognition of UEEs.
3.1. DETECTION METHODS
For the purpose of this research, detection is dened as the the process of
identifying UEEs in a specic frequency band. Moreover, detection is the process of
detecting UEEs that are buried in the ambient noise and determine if there exists
UEEs in a specic frequency band or not.
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3.1.1 Stimulated Detection Methods. The three stimulated detection
methods commonly found in the literature and discussed in this section are: the
modulation method, the long PN code method and the Stagner method. In all of
the methods discussed in this section, an external source is used to strengthen and
improve the quality of the UEEs. It is necessary for the creation of external stimulus
signal in all the three methods. Arrangements has also to be made for capturing and
measuring the reected signals. All these methods also require the computation of
a specic threshold value to decide the presence or absence of UEEs. The threshold
value is calculated based on the measurements in a semi-anechoic chamber. Semi-
anechoic chamber insulates the inside of the chamber from external electromagnetic
radiation to prevent interference with signals within the chamber.
3.1.1.1 Modulation method. In the modulation method, amplitude mod-
ulated signals are used as the stimulus signal to strengthen the UEEs from a device. 
This results in the characteristics of the reected UEEs to be more consistent and 
enhanced, making it easier to detect the presence of the electronic device emitting 
the UEEs [32]. In this method, the energy of the reected stimulated signal is pre-
determined in a semi anechoic chamber. The decision of whether a device is present 
or not is based on the comparison of correlation coecient of the energy level of 
tested stimulated signal with the predetermined stimulated signal. An electronic 
device is considered to be detected if the correlation coecient of the energy level 
of stimulated and the reected signal is greater than a specic threshold value pre-
determined in the semi anechoic chamber. It is claimed in [32] that the probability 
of detection is increased and the probability of false alarm, which is dened as the 
detection of signal when it is not present, is signicantly decreased as compared with 
passive detection method of cascading correlation. This method, however, requires 
many overhead operations as compared to any of the passive detection methods.
3.1.1.2 Long PN code method. Long Pseudo-Noise(PN) Code Method for 
UEE detection uses PN sequence as the stimulation signal [43]. The PN sequence is
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uniformly distributed and independent periodic sequence of binary bits that repeats
after a certain number of bits called the length of the PN sequence. The PN sequence
appears to be random, however, they are not statistically random [44] as it repeats
itself after the length of the PN sequence. In [45], Universal Software Radio Peripheral
(USRP) was used for the purpose of transmitting a PN sequence and receiving the
reected stimulated UEEs. A PN sequence of a specic length was used as the
stimulation signal. The reected stimulated signal consisted of UEEs modulated
with with the PN sequence. The reected PN sequence is then correlated with the
original PN sequence in the stimulated signal. A device is determined to be detected
if this correlation value is larger than the previously determined threshold value. This
threshold value is determined in a noiseless semi-anechoic chamber.
The range of detection is depended on the length of the PN sequence. Lower
length of the PN sequence can detect device for a shorter distance but as the length of
the PN sequence increases, so did the detection range [43]. This eect of an increase
in detection range with an increase in the length of PN code is illustrated in Table
3.1. We can observe in Table 3.1 that when the PN sequence of 63 bits was used as
stimulation signal, the detection range was 26 feet. The detection range subsequently
increased to 48 feet with PN sequence of 2047 bits and to 62 feet with PN sequence of
8191 bits. Even though the Long PN Code Method increases the range of detection
as compared to the modulation method, the actual accuracy of the method was not
given in the research papers [43], [45].
Length of PN sequence Detection range
63 bits 26 feet
2047 bits 48 feet
8191 bits 62 feet
Table 3.1 Detection Range for Long PN Code Method
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3.1.1.3 Stagner method. In this stimulated detection method, the stimu-lated 
signal used is the sum of input RF and local oscillator signal [46]. Selection of 
stimulation signal is comparatively easier than for Modulation Method and Long Code 
PN Method as the restrictions for the signal is that the duration and the power should 
be high [46]. The experiments performed in [46] showed an improved per-formance 
over passive detection method. The disadvantage of this method is that a threshold of 
matched lter value has to be determined for each devices to be detected. This is 
required for the detection process as a detection is made when the number of matches 
of test signal is greater than pre-determined threshold value. Another limitation of this 
study is this is a theoretical study where the signals used were simulated and were not 
the actual signals recorded in an lab based or real world settings.
3.1.2 Passive Detection Method. The six passive detection methods com-
monly found in the literature and discussed in this section are: matched lter method, 
cascading correlation method, Hurst parameter method, granulometric size distri-
bution method, and principal components analysis method. The rst three meth-
ods (matched lter method, cascading correlation method, and the Hurst parameter 
method) are threshold based methods. These methods require the calculation of a 
specic threshold value in an semi-anechoic chamber to decide the presence or absence 
of UEEs. The last two methods (granulometric size distribution method and princi-
pal components analysis method) are not threshold based methods and thus doesn't 
require the overload of calculation of threshold value in a semi-anechoic chamber.
3.1.2.1 Matched lter method. Shaik et al. (2006) used matched lter to 
detect electronic devices based on their UEEs [34]. A matched lter to the signal 
s(t) is a linear time-invariant lter with impulse response h(t) = s(T-t), where s(t) 
is assumed to be conned to the time interval 0  t  T [47]. Matched lters are 
linear lters that are generally used to detect signals corrupted by white Gaussian 
noise[41]. To identify the existence of a particular device, a matched lter is rst
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constructed from a given device. The signal that is to be detected is then passed
through this lter. A signal is determined to be detected if the power of the output
is greater than a predetermined threshold. Even though this is a noble method for
detection of UEEs, the accuracy of the method decreases signicantly as the distance
of the source of emission increases [32]. The matched lter in [34] was constructed
from the noiseless data of semi-anechoic chamber.
3.1.2.2 Cascading correlation method. Cascading Correlation is the pro-cess 
of combining dierent signals by iteratively correlating them together. Cascading 
Correlation method for UEE detection consists of characterizing a device by using 
specic parameters of the emissions in both time and frequency domain. The pa-
rameters are the shape, rate, and frequency content of the emissions pulses, the 
change in frequency content over time, and the change in emissions characteristics 
when subject to dierent noise conditions and environments [32]. An ideal pulse is 
then developed by iteratively cross correlating a statistically signicant number of 
characterized pulses. The normalized pulse value is obtained after correlating all the 
pulses and is called the "ideal pulse". The emission that is to be determined is then 
correlated to the constructed ideal pulse. If the value is above a certain threshold, 
then the emission is determined to be from the corresponding device that generated 
the ideal pulse [32]. Experimental results of this method showed that this method 
can identify the presence of UEEs with an area under the Receiver Operating Char-
acteristic (ROC) curve of 98% at 3 meters. The primary drawback of this method is 
that the ideal pulse has to be determined in a semi-anechoic chamber. This method 
also requires a large number of signals to create the ideal pulse for each device to be 
detected.
3.1.2.3 Hurst parameter method. Hurst Parameter is a measure for the 
long range dependence of a signal. A time series is considered to have long range 
dependence if there is a correlation between time series that sustains throughout the 
time scales [48]. A series is considered to possess long range dependence if the value
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of Hurst parameter is between 0.5 and 1 [48]. Hurst Parameter was rst used for UEE
detection by Hertenstein et al. (2011). [49] used Hurst value is used as a threshold
for dierentiating noise and UEEs [49]. All the test signals with Hurst value above
the threshold value is assumed to be UEEs. This method is based on the assumption
that the long-range dependence characterized by the the Hurst parameter can be
used as an indicator of presence of patterns of data. The experimental study found
that ROC curve of the Hurst parameter was higher than the other methods [49].
The drawback of this method was that the range of detection was only 25cm
and this method is not capable of dierentiating between two or more devices. The
false positive rate of this method, which is the detection of noise as an UEE, is
so high that its practicality is limited. The minimum Hurst parameter for noise is
calculated and any signals with higher hurst parameter is considered as UEE signals
[39]. Higher false positive rate and the inability to dierentiate between two or more
devices are the drawbacks of this methods. Hurst parameters are dicult to measure
[50], and this diculty in measurement adds another limitation on this method.
3.1.2.4 Granulometric size distribution. The methods discussed so far for 
UEE detection is a threshold based method. In threshold based method, a specic 
threshold value is determined based on device characterization. Any value such 
as correlation coecient or match lter value above the threshold value signies a 
presence of device and value less than threshold signies noise. Granulometric Size 
Distribution (GSD) method, proposed in [51], can be considered a novel method as 
it is not a threshold based method.The GSD of a given curve is a function of the 
structuring element size which plots the area under the opened curve against the area 
under the original curve [52]. GSD is basically a morphology based technique where 
a signal is characterized based on the shape of the curve. Any dierence between 
the UEE signal and noise signal will be characterized in their GSD. That is, the 
GSD plot of UEE signal ideally should be dierent from the GSD plot of noise. This 
dierence in shape of the signal can be used to dierentiate between UEE and noise 
[51]. The next step is to classify the GSD curve of UEE from the GSD curve of
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noise. Guardiola and Mallor (2013) accomplished this step by classifying the GSD
curves from both the UEEs and the noise into two groups using the Partition Around
Medoids (PAM) algorithm. PAM is a clustering algorithm that classies data points
based on the distances they are apart from each other and the cluster head called
medoids represents the center of the classied class [53]. PAM has an advantage over
k-means as the cluster head of k-means is just the means of the all the data points
in that cluster whereas in the case of PAM the cluster head is one of the actual data
points that is centrally located in that particular cluster [54]. This method works
well in accurately detecting the UEEs but according to the results presented in [51]
the false positive rate was considerably higher at 36 percent.
3.2. RECOGNITION METHODS
Recognition, for the purpose of this research, is dened as the process of iden-
tifying between two or more sources of UEEs. In case where there is an existence of
two or more sources of UEEs, the process of recognition identies and recognizes the
individual source of UEEs. Recognition is a more sensitive process than detection
because when multiple sources of UEEs exists, the process of detection can only de-
termine that UEEs exists in that frequency band but cannot determine if there are
UEEs from multiple sources. The process of recognition, however, can distinguish
between multiple sources of UEEs.
3.2.1 Neural Networks. Neural Networks (NNs) are machine learning al-
gorithms that are based on the functioning of human brain. A detailed discussion 
of NNs can be found in Section 4.4. NNs are used to detect and identify devices 
ranging from a toy truck to vehicles in [38] and [55]. The NNs presented in Dong 
et al. (2006) consists of a multilayer perceptron with 5 neurons and sigmoid acti-
vation function for the rst hidden layer and 1 neuron and linear transfer function 
for the output layer [55]. The network was trained using the Levenberg-Marquardt 
algorithm. The amplitude vs time plot from eight frequency bands were selected as 
an input to the NN. This method yielded a good detection accuracy of 98 percent.
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Dong et al. (2006) not only detected but also identied between Toyota Tundra, a
GM Cadillac, a Ford Windstar, and ambient noise with 99 percent accuracy. Their
NN architecture comprised of feedforward neural network trained with back propa-
gation algorithm. The input features are the maximum spectral magnitude, average
magnitude over a frequency band divided by the average magnitude over the entire
time-frequency plot, standard deviation of magnitude over a frequency band, number
of points within 3 dB of the maximum spectral magnitude and the number of pulses
over a frequency band.
The major drawback of this method is that it is a black box model which doesn't
give information regarding the actual procedure of generation and emissions of UEEs.
The computational costs of NNs are generally higher as the training consists of many
trials and errors to nd the appropriate NN architecture parameter that gives the
best result.
3.3. SUMMARY
The stimulated detection method requires detailed information about the elec-
tronic device and its emissions to create the external stimulation signal. In addition,
extra devices are required for the purpose of generating the stimulus signal and then
collecting the reected stimulated UEEs. For example, the long PN code method
discussed in Section 3.1.1.2 used USRP for the transmission and the receival of the
stimulus signal. Passive detection methods are the ones that doesn't require the
stimulation signal.
The methods for UEE detection and recognition discussed in this section (except
GSD and NNs) are threshold based methods. In threshold based methods, there is
a need to quantify a certain threshold such that the decision can be made that
detection occurs above the threshold. There are two disadvantages of threshold
based methods: The rst disadvantage is that the threshold value is calculated in
a noise free environment of a semi-anechoic chamber, requiring extra work. The
second disadvantage is that the threshold based methods can only be used for device
detection but not for recognition. The reason for this limitation in threshold based
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methods is that detection occurs for all the values higher than the threshold value.
Any test value higher than the threshold value denotes a presence of device. But
there is no way of identifying two or more devices.
The review of available literature in UEE detection methods demonstrates a
lack of methods that are capable of not only detecting if there is a presence of device
but also distinguishing between two or more devices. The capability of recognition
of UEE makes the implementation of IED detection system for military operation
more eective. For example, in a military eld operation, some of the devices of
the military may emit UEEs. In such circumstances, if the UEE detection system
doesn't have the capability of dierentiating between two or more devices, then the
false alarm rate will be high. This research attempts to ll the gap by exploring
stochastic and computational intelligence methods that can perform passive detec-
tion and recognition of malicious devices based on their UEEs. These methods will
increase the eectiveness of the IED detection system by enhancing its detection and
recognition capability with the less costly passive detection approach. The Neural
Network method, described in section 3.2.1 is the only method that can not only
detect devices, but can also identify and dierentiate between devices. Two or more
than two devices can be modeled by NNs by assigning dierent target values to each
devices. Based on training data, NN will train itself to identify given targets as dif-
ferent devices. Even though NNs has the additional capability of identifying devices,
there are some limitation. The selection of hidden nodes and training parameters is
heuristic, all the parameters have to be re-estimated if one or more devices are added
to the model. The computational cost of this method is high as training neural
networks with large data set takes a signicant amount of time.
The next section will discuss in details how Principal Components Analysis
(PCA), Hidden Markov Model (HMM), and Support Vector Machine can be used in
detecting and recognizing electronic devices based on their UEEs. As NN is the only
method found in the literature that can not only detect but also identify dierent
sources of UEE, this research will compare all the proposed methods of UEE detection
and recognition with NNs for the purpose of validation.
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4. METHODOLOGY
Section 3 reviewed the available literature on the detection of UEEs. There are
many methods available that can detect the presence of UEE. But as discussed in
the previous Section, most of those methods were threshold based methods. Being
threshold based methods, they do not have the capability of dierentiating between
two or more sources of UEEs. This Section will explore the models that are capable
of both detecting and recognizing UEEs. As the focus of this research is on the
passive detection approach where the signals to be detected are weak in power and
are often buried in the noise band, the methods should be versatile enough to over-
come these challenges. This section investigates the performance of three methods,
namely, Principal Components Analysis (PCA), Hidden Markov Models (HMMs),
and Support Vector Machines (SVMs) that has the promise to meet the objective
of recognition capability and overcome the challenge of low power signal buried in
the noise band. This section will introduce the mathematical formulations of each
of these methods and will discuss how these methods can be applied in detecting
and identifying UEEs from RF devices. The common passive detection methods for
UEE detection are discussed in sections 2:2:1 through 2:2:5. Specically, the passive
detection methods Matched Filter, Cascading Correlation, Hurst Parameter, and
Granulometric Size Distribution have been applied to accurately detect the presence
of UEEs. These methods can not, however, identify and dierentiate between two
sources of UEEs. There exists minimal dierence between the properties of UEEs of
two RF devices and thus the methods discussed in Section 3.1.2, with the exclusion
of Neural Networks (NNs), are not sensitive enough to capture the dierences. This
work is not only about exploring new methods for accurately detecting UEEs, but
it is also about nding new methods that can identify and recognize between two
sources of UEEs. There is a need for more methods like Neural Networks that can
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detect and identify two dierent but similar sources of UEEs.
4.1. PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS ANALYSIS
Data that describe a process or a system are generally multivariate in nature
[56]. As the dimension of data increases, so does the diculty of analyzing and
extracting useful information from such data. Data with large number of variables
results in the curse of dimensionality, which is the exponential increase in data space
that is required to train and gather information from such data set [57]. Silverman
(1986) illustrates the problem of curse of dimensionality with the help of an example.
He calculated the number of observations required to estimate the standard multi-
variate normal density function such that the Mean Square Error (MSE) is less than
0.1 [58]. The result of Silverman (1986) is illustrated in Figure 4.1.
It can be seen in Figure 4.1 that for a dataset of one dimension, four samples
are enough to estimate the standard normal density function with MSE less than
























Figure 4.1 Number of Observations Required to Estimate the Standard Multivariate 
Normal Density Function such that the Mean Square Error is less than 0.1
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0.1. But as the dimension of dataset increases, the required sample size to estimate
the standard multivariate normal density increases tremendously to attain MSE less
than 0.1. The gure shows that the required number of samples required to maintain
the MSE error less than 0.1 requires 19, 223, 2790, 43700, and 84200 as the dimension
of dataset increases to 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10 respectively. This increase in the required
sample size with the increase in dimensionality of the dataset is commonly referred
to as the curse of dimensionality.
One way to deal with the problem of curse of dimensionality is to reduce the
dimension of the dataset. Principal Components Analysis (PCA) is one of the most
common method used for reducing the dimensionality of data [59]. PCA reduces
the original set of variables, into a new set of variables called principal components
(PCs). PCs are the linear combination of original variables. The rst PC is the
direction that signies the maximum variation in the original data set. The second
PC is the direction that signies maximum variation that is uncorrelated to the rst
PC. Similarly, subsequent PCs signify the directions of maximum variation that are
uncorrelated to the previous PCs [60]. Moreover, as explained in 4.1.1, PCs are the
Eigenvectors of the covariance matrix of the variables arranged by Eigenvalues [61].
The reduction in variable occurs as the transformation takes place from original set
of variables to the PCs and the number of PCs are always less than or equal to the
number of original variables. The original variables are represented by lesser number
of PCs, thus reducing the dimensionality.
The concept of Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR) can be used to explain why PCA
can be used for UEE detection. SNR is dened as the ratio of signal power to the
noise power [44]. Shlens (2005) has demonstrated that the ratio of consecutive PCs
is nothing but the SNR of the signal [62]. The ratio of two consecutive PCs of the
noise signal has to be lower than the ratio of two consecutive PCs of the UEEs as
the noise has lower SNR than the UEEs. Thus, fewer PCs will be able to explain
most of the variation in UEEs whereas many PCs of noise signal will be required to
explain most of its variation.
This concept can be veried with the help of examples. PCA was rst performed
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on White Gaussian Noise (WGN) to study the characteristics of PCs on WGN. Figure
4.2 demonstrates the contribution of top 10 PCs on those noise signals. It can be
observed in Figure 4.2 that the top 10 PCA explains almost equal amount of variation
in the data. The contribution of each of the top 10 PCs are about 3.5% and the top
10 PCs explain only about 32% of the variation in the dataset.
The PCA was then performed on the square signal, triangle signal, and the
sawtooth signal with the same dimension as the noise signal. The pareto diagram of
the top PCs of square, triangle, and sawtooth signals are illustrated in the Figures
4.3, 4.4, and 4.5. It can be observed in the gures that top 9 PCs explained 100% of
the variation for all the three types of signals. But in the case of noise, the percentage
of variation explained by top 10 PCs is only 32.29%. The contribution of top 10 PCs
of the three signals and the noise is illustrated in Table 4.1 and Figure 4.6 for clarity.
Noise are signals that uctuates randomly. The variation of amplitude of noise signal
is constant throughout the signal. Due to this constant variation in noise, all the
PCs explains almost equal amount of variation. In case of any other signals, however,
Figure 4.2 PCA of White Gaussian Noise
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Figure 4.3 PCA of Square Signals
there is a variation of amplitude throughout the signal. The amplitude of the signal
will be higher in some portion of the signal whereas it will be lower in other portions.
Due to this variation of amplitude, the top PCs will explain most of the variation of
the signal. Since the variation of amplitude of UEEs is not random, the top PCs of
UEE will explain most of the variation. This property of PCA can be used to detect
UEEs from noise.
PC Square Signal Triangle Signal Sawtooth Signal Noise
1st 22.59% 18.19% 16.44% 3.57%
2nd 37.60% 32.68% 31.57% 6.99%
3rd 49.70% 46.58% 44.97% 10.37%
4th 60.36% 58.96% 56.39% 13.63%
5th 70.16% 68.97% 67.34% 16.88%
6th 79.15% 78.09% 76.84% 20.04%
7th 86.46% 86.12% 85.47% 23.17%
8th 93.46% 93.54% 93.04% 26.24%
9th 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 29.29%
10th 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 32.29%
Table 4.1 Distribution of Variation Explained by Principal Components
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Figure 4.4 PCA of Triangle Signals































Figure 4.5 PCA of Sawtooth Signals
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Figure 4.6 Percentage of Variation Explained by Each of the Top 10 PCs of Noise, 
Square Signal, Triangle Signal, and Sawtooth Signal
Section 4.1.1 will mathematically dene the PCA approach and section 4.1.2
will discuss the PCA methodology employed with the UEE and noise dataset.
4.1.1 Denition. PCA is an eigenvalue analysis of the covariance matrix that 
ranks the components that explain most variation in the data [63]. The derivation 
of PCA given in [64] will now be briey summarized.
Let Ap be input data where X is a set of m-dimensional input vectors with fx1,
x2, ... , xmg as the m attributes. The objective of PCA is to nd m dimensional
orthogonal vectors l that can represent the variation in X such that l  m and l is the
number of principal components. An orthogonal transformation matrix Q has to be
found that can transform the original input vector X into a reduced dimensionality
input vector Xr such that:
Xr = QX
Let a = [a1, a2, ... , am]
T be a set of projections where
faj j j = 1, 2, ... ,mg. The projection can now be dened as the inner product
of the vector X and unit vector q such that
Ap = X
T q = qTX








where R is the correlation matrix of X
Let a and b to be any m  1 vectors, then
aTRb = bTRa
The variance of projection Ap can be written as a function of the unit vector q
as follows:
 (q) = qTRq
The next step is to solve the following eigenvalue problem
Rq = p (1)
where p are the eigenvalues of the correlation matrix R and the values of q
associated with p are the eigenvectors.
Eigenvalues p is computed using the relation
(R - p)q = 0
The eigenvectors Q = [q1, q2, ... , qm] represent the set of orthogonal vectors of
the projection and the associated eigenvalues dene the contribution of each eigen-









Power(Watt) = 10[(Power(dBm) 30)=10)] (3)
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Figure 4.7 Experimental Setup for Data Collection
Orthogonality of the transferred variables is one of the important assumption of
PCA [65]. Principal Components, the transferred variable in PCA are the variables
that should be orthogonal to each other. Principal Components are the eigenvectors
of the covariance matrix, and since eigenvectors are orthogonal to each other, the
assumption of orthogonality of the transferred variables are satised.
4.1.2 UEE Detection Using PCA. Data collection for this project was done 
using U3700 spectrum analyzer by Advantest and VERT400 tri-band antenna. 
CXT225 Two-Way Radio from Cobra MicroTalk and XR150U Business Two-Way 
Radio are selected as simple RF radios for the purpose of proof of concept exploration. 
The reference name of D1 and D2 will refer to the previously mentioned RF receivers 
respectively. The operating frequency of the devices is from 450 to 470 MHz. As 
UEEs have very low power emissions, for the purpose of clarity, a 20 KHz span was 
chosen for each device. The span of D1 was from 441001.140 kHz to 441021.140 kHz 
and the span of D2 was from 438215.064 kHz to 438235.064 kHz. The readings were 
taken at 3, 6, and 10 feet from the spectrum analyzer. So there are data sets for 
seven cases with six cases for two devices at three dierent distances and one case
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Figure 4.8 Application of PCA for UEE detection
for noise collected within the same operating environment. A schematic setup for
data collection is shown in Figure 4.7. To collect data, the spectrum analyzer was
set to - 30db level to appropriately display the signal on screen. On every collection
instance of an UEE, a sample of 1,001 points are stored. 40 such instances of UEE
are collected for noise and both D1 and D2 at three distances.
4.1.3 Feature Extraction. The process ow diagram for UEE detection is 
illustrated in Figure 4.8. The rst step is collecting the data. A detailed explanation 
of how the data was collected for two devices for three dierent distances and for 
noise is explained in section 4.1.2. The second step is the data preparation step. The 
unit of dBm is a logarithmic scale, so it is converted to Watt for easier calculation 
using Equation 3. All the data computations are done by computer software and they 
utilize their own built in algorithms for calculating data. But even the basic operation 
like multiplication is dierent for a log data than for any other type of numeric 
data. The conversion from decibel to watt ensures that the data processing software 
doesn't take decibel data like any other numeric data and perform mathematical 
operations that results in unwanted results. A covariance matrix is then calculated 
for each dataset. If there are m observations of amplitude against frequency, then the 
dimension of covariance matrix R will be mXm. Since there are 1001 observations of 
amplitude against frequency, the dimension of the covariance matrix is 1001X1001. 
As all covariance matrix are square matrix, eigenvectors and eigenvalues is calculated 
for the covariance matrix R by solving the Equation 1. The eigenvectors are then 
ordered based on the value of their eigenvalues. The percentage contribution of each 
component was calculated by dividing the percentage component of each PC by the
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sum of all percentage contribution using Equation 2. The results are discussed in
Section 5:1.
4.2. HIDDEN MARKOV MODELS
Hidden Markov Models (HMMs) are doubly embeded stochastic process in
which one stochastic process is a markov chain that is not observable and another is
an observable stochastic process. Inference about the hidden process is made through
its relationship with the observable process. Figure 4.9 illustrates the basic struc-
ture of an HMM. The hidden layer consist of a Markov chain in which the states
are denoted by S1; S2; :::; Sn. The Markov chain cannot be observed directly because
it is a hidden layer. There is another stochastic process which is observable and
is related to the hidden Markov chain. The observations of this stochastic process
are denoted by O1; O2; :::; On in Figure 4.9. Inference about the hidden layer, and
thus the system in general is made by a set of well developed algorithms such as
forward algorithm, Viterbi algorithm, and Baum-Welch algorithm. Details of these
algorithms are discussed in Sections 4.2.3, 4.2.4, and 4.2.5.
HMMs are used in a number of areas. They are particularly useful in stochas-
tic processes in which complete information on the transition of a system from one
state to another is unavailable, but there exists another stochastic process which is
observable and is dependent on the hidden process. HMMs have been successfully
used in speech recognition [66], biological sequence recognition such as protein se-
quence recognition and DNA sequence recognition [67], gesture recognition [68],
handwriting recognition [69], and more. Some researchers have even attempted to
apply HMM to detect rare events like earthquake [70].
Gesture recognition system can be modeled using HMM by representing the
silhouettes of gait cycle as observations and the dierent boundaries formed by the
pixels of the silhouette plots as the hidden states [71]. HMM can model facial expres-
sion detection by representing dierent features from the face videos as observations
and the ow of dierent emotions of human beings as hidden states [72]. HMM can
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Figure 4.9 Basic Structure of Hidden Markov Model
be used to label any unlabeled string of nucleotides by representing the nucleotide
sequence as observations and dierent DNA sequence as the hidden states [73]. In
case of handwriting recognition system, features extracted from writing like the an-
gle between two successive points measured at regular intervals can be considered as
observations and combinations of characters can be considered as hidden states [69].
In speech recognition, perhaps the most successful application of HMM, acoustic fea-
ture vectors such as mel-frequency cepstrum coecients are used as states and the
dierent phonemes of sound are used as observations [74]. In case of earthquake de-
tection, Beyreuther et. al (2012) modeled HMM by using the principal components of
seismogram data as observations and the clustered data of dierent geological events
as hidden states [75]. The next section discusses the observations and hidden states
of HMM as it relates to UEEs.
4.2.1 HMMs and UEEs. It has been illustrated in Figure 2.4 and Figure 2.5 
that UEEs are generated due to the leakage in internal circuitry of the device. The 
leakages then couple with the device's antennae and is emitted to the outside 
environment as UEEs. Since it is extremely dicult to predict the actual amount of
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Figure 4.10  Hidden Markov Model for UEE Identication
leakage at a point in time, we cannot accurately model the UEE generation process
directly. But the properties of UEEs after they are generated and unintentionally
emitted to the outside environment can be measured. This process can be modeled
using HMM: The information gathered from the observation can be used to infer the
inside working mechanisms of the device that produced the UEEs. This process is
schematically described in Figure 4.10. The leakage from electromagnetic devices
are classied into two types: lower power leakage and higher power leakage. These
two leakages are taken as the two hidden states and are referred as low leakage
and high leakage. Low leakage is taken as state 1 and high leakage is taken as
state 2. It is very dicult to measure the total leakage from the device, but the
unintended emissions due to the leakages from various sources of the internal circuitry
can be measured. These measurable observations are classied into four classes:
low emission, medium emission, medium-high emission and high emission. HMMs
with unique parameters for each devices can be constructed using the information of
hidden state and observations. The overall signal identication process is illustrated
in Figure 4.11.
4.2.2   Denition. Hidden Markov Models (HMMs) are doubly embeded stochas-
tic process with an underlying stochastic process that is not observable, but can only
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Figure 4.11 Signal Identication Process
be observed through another set of stochastic processes that produce the sequence
of observations [66]. We can dene an HMM by the following ve elements [66].
1. The number of states in the model is the rst element to dene an HMM. We
will denote this number by N. It represents the total number of states present
in the hidden stochastic process. The individual states will be denoted as S =
fS1, S2, ..., SNg.
2. The second element to characterize the HMM is the number of observation
symbols. It represents the total number of distinct observations and we repre-
sent it by T in this paper. The individual observations will be represented by
O = fO1, O2, ..., OTg.
3. The state transition probability distribution is the third element of HMM. We
represent it by A = faijg where aij = P[qt+1 = Sj j qt = Si], 1i, jN
4. The observation symbol probability distribution in state j, B = fbj(k)g where
bj(k) = P[Ok = t j qt = Sj], 1jN, 1kM
5. The initial probability distribution is the fth element that characterize HMM
and it is represented by  = fig where i = P[q1 = Si], 1iN
for convenience, an HMM is denoted by the tuple  = (A, B, )
4.2.3 Three Problems for HMM. There are three problems that can be 
solved by a HMM [66]. They are:
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1. The evaluation problem is the computation of the probability that a given set
of observations is produced by a particular HMM. This makes it possible to
choose a best model from a set of competing models. Mathematically, if a set
of observation is represented by O = fO1,O2, ..., OTg and we have a HMM 
= (A, B, ), evaluation problem is the calculation of P(O j ). This is solved
using the forward algorithm.
2. The decoding problem is concerned with the calculation of most likely states
that generate a given set of observations. This problem is essentially to decode
the hidden state from visible set of observations. Mathematically, given O =
fO1,O2, ..., OTg and  = (A, B, ), the decoding problem is to calculate the
most likely sequence of states the hidden stochastic process went through to
generate O. This problem is solved by the Viterbi algorithm.
3. The learning problem is related to the training of the model parameters. We
want to train  = (A, B, ) with the objective of maximizing P(O j ). This
is solved using Baum Welch algorithm.
4.2.4  Solution to the Evaluation Problem.  The problem in this case is to 
calculate P(O j ), which is to calculate the probability of occurrence of the 
observation sequence O = O1,O2, ..., OT given the model  = (A, B, ). To solve this 
problem, a forward variable t(i) is dened such that:
t(i) = P(O1,O2, ..., Ot, qt = i j )
Forward probability is dened as the probability of the partial observation se-
quence O1,O2 ,..., Ot and state i at time t, given the model  [66]. t(i) can be solved
inductively as follows:
1. The rst step initializes the forward probabilities as the joint probability of
state i and initial observation o1 as follows:
t(i) = ibi(o1), 1 i  N
2. The second step is of induction which shows how state j can be reached at time
t+1 from the N possible states at time t:
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t+1(j) = fPNi=1 t(i)ijgbj(ot+1), 1 t  T and 1 j  N
3. The third step gives the value of P(O j ) by summing all the forward variables
T (i) :
P(O j ) = PNi=1 T (i)
4.2.5  Solution to the Decoding Problem. t(i) is dened as the best score 
along a single path, at time t, which accounts for the rst t observations and ends in 
state i as:
t(i) = maxq1; q2; :::; qt 1 P[q1; q2; :::; qt 1; qt = i; o1o2:::ot j ]
By induction,
t+1(j) = [maxit(i)aij].bj(ot+1)
Another variable  1(i) is dened to keep track of the argument that maximized
t+1(j) for each value of t and j. Following steps summarize the viterbi algorithm:
1. First step initializes the variables t(i) and  1(i) such that
t(i) = ibi(o1), 1  i  N
 1(i) = 0
2. Subsequent values for the variables initialized in step 1 is calculated by the
process of recursion
t(j) = max1iN [t 1(i)aij]bj(ot), 2  t  T and 1  j  N
 1(i) = arg max1iN [t 1(i)aij], 2  t  T and 1  j  N
3. Third step is to terminate the recursion started in step 2
P  = max1 i  N [T (i)]
qT = arg max1 i  N [T (i)]
4. The nal step consists of determining the state sequence by backtracking the
variable  1(i) dened earlier




t+1), t = T-1,T-2,...,1
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4.2.6 Solution to the Learning Problem. In HMM, the term learning
denotes the process of training the algorithm based on existing data set [66]. To
solve the learning problem, a variable t(i,j) and t(i) is dened such that
t(i,j) = P(qt = i, qt+1 = j j O, )
t(i) =P(qt = i j O, )














4.2.7  Data Collection and Preprocessing. The data collection process is 
described in Section 4.1.2. The raw data was converted from dBm to Watt using 
Equation 3. The reason for this conversion is that the dBm data is in logarithmic scale. 
All the data calculations are done by computer software and they utilize their own 
built in algorithms for calculating data. But even the basic operation like 
multiplication is dierent for a log data than for any other type of numeric data. The 
conversion from decibel to watt ensures that the computer doesn't take decibel data 
like any other numeric data and perform mathematical operations that results in 
unwanted results. Windowing operation was then performed on each instances of 
data. Each window consisted of 100 data points and has an overlap of 50 data points.
4.2.8 Feature Extraction. Some features from the observable process 
is required to model a system by HMM. The average power of the signal in each 
window created is taken as the feature vector of the UEE signal. The process of 
creation of window is described in 4.2.7. Average power is calculated by 
integrating the power at each frequency of the window by rectangular 








Figure 4.12 Ergodic Markov Chain
4.2.9 Training. The four levels of emissions are the four observations of the 
HMM and the two levels of overall device leakage are the two hidden states. The 
topology of Markov chain is ergodic for the UEE is taken as ergodic. Figure 4.12 
illustrates the ergodic Markov chain for the UEE Markov chain. An ergodic Markov 
chain is one where it is possible for a state of the Markov chain to reach any other 
state. The leakage from the RF devices are taken as states. The two states are 
low emission and high emission. Since the states represents the leakage of the 
device, having just one state is not enough to capture the dierent levels of leakage 
from the device. But two states can model the leakage of device by allowing the 
device to be either in one of the low emission leakage state or high emission leakage 
state. Even though more number of states can be taken, two states can accurately 
model the dierences in the leakage level from the device. As the state can move 
from low emission to both low emission and high emission and from high emission 
to both high emission and low emission, ergodic markov chain is the most natural 
topology to represent UEE emission. The average power are the observations and 
there are four discretized observations which are low emission, medium emission, 
medium high emission and high emission. The observations are the set of features 
extracted from the UEE signal discussed. In the case of UEE signal, the observations 
are the average power. The calculation of the observed power for each window is 
discussed in Section 4.2.8. The average power is divided into four interquartile range 
and each range is taken as one of the four observation signal. These observations
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are passed as an input to the Baum Welch algorithm to train the HMM discussed
in Section 4.2.6. HMMs are trained with these observation with the 30 training
data set. Maximum Iteration value of 500 or the tolerance of 10 6, whichever is
rst achieved is taken as the stopping criteria for the Baum Welch algorithm. The
initial probability for each state is taken as 0.5. The output of this process is a
trained HMM. Viterbi algorithm discussed in Section 4.2.5 was then applied to the
trained HMM. A pairwise comparison of D1 and D2 at three dierent distances of
3 feet, 6 feet, and 10 feet was performed. Pairwise comparison of both devices at
three distances was also performed with noise. The results of the experiment are
illustrated on the Results section.
4.2.10 Assumptions of HMM. Statistical methods are based on some un-
derlying assumptions. Like any other models the theory of HMMs are also based 
on some assumptions. According to Rabiner (1989), and Bhat et. al (2002), the 
Markovian assumption is the major assumption to the theory of HMM [66], [76]. 
The Markovian assumption states that the probability of being in a given state at 
time t+1 is depended only on the state at time t and not on any previous states, 
such that:
aij = P[qt+1 = Sj j qt = Si], 1i, jN
This assumption pose a serious limitations on the applicability of HMMs. Var-
ious applications of HMMs were discussed in Section 4.2. Speech recognition is
considered to be the most successful application of HMMs [77]. One of the most
cited paper on speech recognition system is by Rabiner (1989) but he unequivocally
states in the paper that these assumptions are violated for speech sounds. One of
the beauties of HMMs lies in the fact that in spite of the limitations of assumptions
of HMMs being violated, the method works extremely well in speech recognition
problem [66].
The Markovian assumption can be veried by testing for the null hypothesis
of independent Markov chain against the alternate hypothesis of rst order Markov
chain:
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Null Hypothesis (Ho): aij = P[qt+1 6= Sj j qt = Si], 1i, jN
Alternate Hypothesis (H1): aij = P[qt+1 = Sj j qt = Si], 1i, jN
The 2 test statistic to test independence against rst order Markovian depen-
dence is given in [78] as:








with (n  1)2 degree of freedom, where,
n = number of states









The data collected from two devices at three dierent distances were converted
from dBm to Watt using Equation 3 in order to test the hypothesis. Windowing
operation was then performed as discussed in Section 4.2.7 and average power for
each window is calculated using Equation 3. The details of data processing steps can
be found in Section 4.2.7 and Section 4.2.8. The value of n is taken as 2 as the HMM
for UEE is modeled by two states. fij is calculated using TPM for Markov chain
as calculated and explained in Section 4.2.9. The only dierence between the TPM
calculated in Section 4.2.9 and here is that in Section 4.2.9, only 30 data set were
used to calculate TPM for the training purpose, but for the verication of Markov
assumption, all 40 available data sets were used to calculate the TPM.
Device Chi Square Value p value Verdict
Device 1 at 3 ft 325.7302 <0.00001 Reject H0
Device 1 at 6 ft 541.5781 <0.00001 Reject H0
Device 1 at 10 ft 559.5422 <0.00001 Reject H0
Device 2 at 3 ft 278.7866 <0.00001 Reject H0
Device 2 at 6 ft 312.0549 <0.00001 Reject H0
Device 2 at 10 ft 528.0602 <0.00001 Reject H0
Noise 565.5422 <0.00001 Reject H0
Table 4.2 Chi Square Test for First Order Markov Chain
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Table 4.2 summarizes the results of 2 test for rst order Markov assumption.
It can be observed in the Table that the calculated 2 value for all the seven cases is
greater than the tabulated 2(0:05;1) value of 3.841. The null hypothesis of independent
Markov chain is thus rejected and we assume that rst order Markovian assumptions
holds true.
4.3. SUPPORT VECTOR MACHINE
The mathematical theory of Support Vector Machine (SVM) was developed
by Vapnik in the 90s [79], [80]. SVM is generally used for pattern classication
and nonlinear regression [64]. In SVM, the margin of separation between dierent
classes of input vectors is maximized by the separating hyperplane. An illustration
of SVM is illustrated in Figure 4.13. The gure illustrates how two class of linearly
separable vectors, which are represented by circles and squares, are separated by
SVM. The vectors which are closest to the separating plane are called the support
vector. It is denoted by SV in Figure 4.13. SVM considers only the support
vectors while constructing the separating plane. There can be many plane that can
separate the two class of vectors. For example, in Figure 4.13, L1, L2, and L3 are
the three separating plane that separates the vectors into two distinct classes. The
separating plane created by the SVM is such that the margin of separation between
the separating plane and the vectors is highest. It can be observed in Figure 4.13
that L1 is the plane where the margin of separation is the highest.
SVM is mostly applied to the problems that are related to pattern classication
and nonlinear regression [81].
A mathematical representation of SVM will now be presented. If (xi, di), i =
1,,N be a set of patterns where di(+1, -1) then the separating hyperplane created
by SVM is represented by:
wTx+ b = 0, where w and b are the weight vectors and the bias.
The input points closest to the separating hyperplane are called support vectors.
In Figure 4.13, the support vectors are represented by SV. We can observe in Figure
4.13 that there are two support vector for square class and two support vector for class
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Figure 4.13 Support Vector Machine
the circle class. The margin of separation, denoted by , is the distance between the
separating hyperplane and the support vectors. Unlike other classiers like Neural
Networks, SVM creates the separating hyperplane that maximizes the margin of
separation. So L1 is the separating hyperplane created by SVM in Figure 4.13.




i=1a0;idixi where a is Lagrange multiplier
b0 = d
(s) - wT0 x
(s)
Please refer to [64] for detailed derivation.
SVM are equally capable of separating non linear patterns. The two theorems
that enables SVM in separating non linear data set are the Cover's Theorem and
the Mercer's Theorem. Cover (1965) states that "A complex pattern-classication
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problem, cast in a high-dimensional space nonlinearly, is more likely to be linearly
separable than in a low-dimensional space, provided that the space is not densely
populated" [82]. So a data set that is not linearly separable can be separated by
projecting it into some higher dimensional space. There is no need to calculate
the weight vector w0 and just specifying the kernel will perform the task of data
separation in the higher dimensional space and this procedure is called kernel trick
[64]. Mercer's Theorem is applied to determine if a particular kernel function can
be used in SVM. It states that the general form of inner product is dened by the
function K(x; y) that satises the condition:R
K(x; y)z(x)z(y)dxdy  0
for all functions z(x), z(y) satisfying the inequalityR
z2(x)dx  1 [80].
Radial basis function, which can be represented as:
K(x; xi) = exp f  jx xij22 g
is one of the kernel that satises Mercer's conditions [64].
30 data set was used for training purpose and 10 were used as testing purpose
for two devices at three dierent distances. Support vector machine was run on
R programming language, version 3.0.0 using e1071 package. Radial basis was the
kernel used in training and predicting purpose because it satises Mercer's conditions.
The results of this experiment is illustrated in Section 5.
4.4. NEURAL NETWORKS
Articial Neural Networks (ANNs), commonly abbreviated as Neural Networks
(NNs) are machine learning algorithms that is based on the functioning of human
brain. Wernick et. al (2010) dened machine learning as a set of methods to make
predictions on a new data set based on the relationship of variables that is learnt and
understood in the existing data set [83]. This denition denes machine learning
as a two step process. The rst step consists of learning the relationship between
variables in data set. The second step consists of making predictions based on the
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knowledge gained in the rst step on a new data set that is not part of the training
process.
Neural Networks have been successfully used to solve many problems from dif-
ferent areas. Widrow et. al (1994) identies three key areas of successful application
of NNs and they are Pattern Recognition, Financial Analysis and Prediction, and
Optimization and Control [84]. Credit card fraud detection is one of the most
well known pattern recognition application of NNs. One of the earliest application
of credit card fraud detection using Neural Networks was developed by Ghosh et.
al (1994). They trained the NNs with dierent credit card transactions and used
target values such as fraud transaction from lost card, stolen card, and counterfeit
card. This NNs based credit card fraud detection system was implemented in Mellon
Bank's credit card portfolio as the NNs were able to detect more fraudulent trans-
actions with 20% less false positive prediction than the traditionally used rule based
detection system [85].
Stock market price forecasting is another major application of NNs. The reason
that NNs is an eective method for stock market forecasting is that nancial market
exhibit non linearity and NNs is a very good tool to model nonlinear process [86].
Hawley et. al (1990) were one of the earliest researchers proposing the application
of NNs for nancial decision making [87]. In one of the application of NNs in stock
market price prediction, Schierholt et. al (1996) trained NNs with inputs such as
closing value of current day's S & P 500 Index value, change in index value in one
week and two weeks. The network was designed with three output: buy, sell, and
keep current status. The result demonstrated that NNs gave better performance
relative to the & P 500 Index [88].
NNs have been used to detect electronic devices through their UEEs. NNs
are used to detect and identify devices ranging from a toy truck to vehicles in [38]
and [55]. The NNs of Dong et al. (2006) consists of a multilayer perceptron with
5 neurons and sigmoid activation function for the rst hidden layer and 1 neuron
and linear transfer function for the output layer. The network was trained using the
Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm. The amplitude vs time plot from eight frequency
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Figure 4.14 Neural Networks
bands were selected as an input to the NN. This method yielded a good detection
accuracy of 98 percent.
Dong et al. (2006) not only detected but also identied between Toyota Tundra,
a GM Cadillac, a Ford Windstar, and ambient noise with 99 percent accuracy. Their
NN architecture comprised of feedforward neural network trained with back propa-
gation algorithm. The input features are the maximum spectral magnitude, average
magnitude over a frequency band divided by the average magnitude over the entire
time-frequency plot, standard deviation of magnitude over a frequency band, number
of points within 3 dB of the maximum spectral magnitude and the number of pulses
over a frequency band. The accuracy of this method is 99.3%. As NNs have been
successfully used to detect and identify devices using their UEEs, the performance
of the proposed methods in this research would be compared to the performance of
the NNs for the validation purpose.
Figure 4.14 shows a schematic diagram of a NN. x1; x2; :::; xm are the input
signals to the NNs and wkj where j is the input index and k is the neuron index. k
is the output of the summation junction and the output signal yk = (k+ bk) where
 is the activation function and bk is the bias. The NN used backpropagation learning
algorithm with Sigmoid activation function. There were two hidden layers and ve
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number of inputs. The learning rate was 0.5. The stopping criteria was maximum
iteration of 1000 or minimum gradient of 0.0001, whichever was rst reached. The
results of this experiment is illustrated on Section 5.
This section provided the theoretical background on PCA, HMM, SVM, and
NN. It also described the methodology on how these methods can be used to detect
and recognize electronic devices based on their UEEs. Since NN is the only method
found in the literature that can not only detect but also identify dierent sources
of UEE, comparison of PCA, HMM, and SVM is done with NN. Next Section will
provide the results of the performance of the three methods (PCA, HMM, and SVM)
and its comparative performance as it relates to NN.
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5. RESULTS
Three new methods are proposed in this research for passive detection of UEEs.
The three methods are PCA, HMM, and SVM. Each of these methods along with
all the details of the experimentation is discussed in details in Section 4. This sec-
tion provides the results of the experimental study described in Section 4. Section
5.1 will provide the results on detection and Section 5.2 will provide results on the
performance of the algorithms regarding the recognition of electronic devices.
5.1. DETECTION
For the purpose of this research, detection is dened as the ability of the three
methods (PCA, HMM, and SVM) in distinguishing UEEs from noise. This section
will discuss the performance of these three methods in detecting UEE signals based
on the experimental study discussed in Section 4.
5.1.1 Principal Components Analysis. This work proposes PCA as a 
method for UEE detection. The premise behind this proposal is that, as discussed 
in Section 4.1, the top PCs of noise should have equal contribution in explaining the 
variation in the dataset whereas the few top PCs on UEE signal should explain most 
of the variation in the dataset.
The contribution of top 10 PCs of noise and two devices at three dierent
distance is illustrated on Table 5.1. The rst column lists the number of principal
components. The next six columns lists the contribution of each of the 10 principal
components for two devices at three dierent distances and the last column lists the
same for noise.
It can be observed in Table 5.1 that the top two PCs of both devices at three
dierent distances of 3 feet, 6 feet, and 10 feet explains at least 64% of the variability
of the UEE signal. This proportion is less than 22% for the noise signal. The top ve
principal components of the devices explains at least 80% of the total variation but
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PC D1-3ft D1-6ft D1-10ft D2-3ft D2-6ft D2-10ft Noise
1st 57.15% 49.97% 61.85% 43.68% 83.11% 51.84% 13.04%
2nd 80.23% 73.39% 82.49% 65.97% 88.50% 64.00% 21.64%
3rd 89.24% 85.39% 89.75% 77.16% 93.00% 72.97% 29.05%
4th 95.19% 92.08% 94.93% 84.62% 95.70% 76.92% 34.77%
5th 98.19% 96.36% 97.75% 90.54% 97.04% 80.42% 40.37%
6th 98.87% 97.90% 98.60% 93.61% 97.91% 82.84% 45.75%
7th 99.33% 98.90% 99.31% 95.84% 98.52% 84.62% 50.37%
8th 99.59% 99.35% 99.61% 97.30% 99.01% 86.31% 54.77%
9th 99.72% 99.62% 99.75% 98.25% 99.36% 87.43% 58.69%
10th 99.82% 99.77% 99.84% 98.76% 99.54% 88.49% 62.21%
Table 5.1 Cumulative Contribution of Top 10 Principal Components (PC)
in case of noise, it is less than 50%. Similarly, top ten principal components of the
devices explains at least 85% of the variation whereas for noise it is less than 65%.
Table 5.2 further claries the contribution of PCs of devices by taking the
average of two devices at three dierent distances and comparing it with the top
10 contribution of PCs of noise. The same information is presented in Figure 5.1.
Taking average makes the comparison between contribution of PCs more easier to
understand and visualize. Top two PCs of devices contributes 75.76% of variation
whereas the contribution is only 13.04% in case of noise. Top ve PCs of device
contribute 93.38% of variation but top 5 PCs of noise is only 40.37%. If all the top
10 principal components are considered, the contribution for device is 97.50% but it
is only 62.21% for noise.
Figures 5.2 through 5.8 illustrates the explained variability in all seven cases
in a pareto plot. A pareto chart is a bar plot where a line graph represents the
cumulative eect of the bars in the plot [89].
Based on these observations, a decision table is developed as shown in table
5.3 to detect UEE signals from noise signals.
50











Table 5.2 Average Contribution of Top 10 PCs for Devices and Noise











Average contribution of top 10 PCs for devices and noise































Figure 5.1 Average Contribution of Top 10 PCs for Devices and Noise
No. of Top PC Total Variation Explained Results
2 less than 50% NOISE
2 greater than 50% UEE
5 less than 75% NOISE
5 greater than 75% UEE
10 less than 80% NOISE
10 greater than 80% UEE
Table 5.3 Decision Table to Detect UEE
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Figure 5.2 Principal Components of Noise






























Figure 5.3 Principal Components of Device 1 at 3 feet





























Figure 5.4 Principal Components of Device 1 at 6 feet
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Figure 5.5 Principal Components of Device 1 at 10 feet






























Figure 5.6 Principal Components of Device 2 at 3 feet
































Figure 5.7 Principal Components of Device 2 at 6 feet
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Figure 5.8 Principal Components of Device 2 at 10 feet
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5.1.2  Hidden Markov Models. Results show that HMM can detect whether 
there is any electronic device active within a detection range or not. Table 5.4 sum-
marizes the performance of the model in detecting UEEs'. It illustrates the pairwise
comparison of noise with each devices at three dierent distances. The detection rate is
100% for devices at 3 feet but the accuracy decreased to 95% as the distance is
increased to 10 feet.
Test Device
Predicted Noise D1-3 feet
Noise 10 0
D1-3 feet 0 10
Accuracy 100%
Predicted Noise D1-6 feet
Noise 10 0
D1-6 feet 0 10
Accuracy 100%
Predicted Noise D1-10 feet
Noise 10 1
D1-10 feet 0 9
Accuracy 95%
Predicted Noise D2-3 feet
Noise 10 0
D2-3 feet 0 10
Accuracy 100%
Predicted Noise D2-6 feet
Noise 10 0
D2-6 feet 0 10
Accuracy 100%
Predicted Noise D2-10 feet
Noise 9 1
D2-10 feet 1 9
Accuracy 90%
Table 5.4 Device Detection using HMM
The power of UEE is higher when the source of signal is near and the power
decreases as the distance increases. As the distance increases, power of UEE decreases
and it starts getting buried in the ambient noise. The dierence between the noise
and UEE signal become less prominent at larger distance. Due to this reason, the
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accuracy of HMM in device detection is higher at small distance and the accuracy
decreases as the distance increases.
5.1.3  Support Vector Machine. SVM gives 100% accuracy in detecting 
UEEs. The result is illustrated in table 5.5.It was discussed in Section 4.13 that SVM
creates a separating hyperplane such that the the margin of separation between noise
and UEE is maximized by the separating hyperplane. This means that the boundary
that separates noise and UEE is placed exactly in the middle between the two classes.
Hence any test signals are more likely to be classied correctly resulting in high
detection accuracy.
Test Device
Predicted Noise D1 at 3 feet
Noise 10 0
D1 at 3 feet 0 10
Accuracy 100%
Predicted Noise D1 at 6 feet
Noise 10 0
D1 at 6 feet 0 10
Accuracy 100%
Predicted Noise D1 at 10 feet
Noise 10 0
D1 at 10 feet 0 10
Accuracy 100%
Predicted Noise D1 at 3 feet
Noise 10 0
D2 at 3 feet 0 10
Accuracy 100%
Predicted Noise D2 at 6 feet
Noise 10 0
D2 at 6 feet 0 10
Accuracy 100%
Predicted Noise D2 at 10 feet
Noise 10 o
D2 at 10 feet 0 10
Accuracy 100%
Table 5.5 Device Detection using SVM
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Test Device
Predicted Noise D1 at 3 feet
Noise 10 0
D1 at 3 feet 0 10
Accuracy 100%
Predicted Noise D1 at 6 feet
Noise 10 0
D1 at 6 feet 0 10
Accuracy 100%
Predicted Noise D1 at 10 feet
Noise 10 0
D1 at 10 feet 0 10
Accuracy 100%
Predicted Noise D1 at 3 feet
Noise 10 0
D2 at 3 feet 0 10
Accuracy 100%
Predicted Noise D2 at 6 feet
Noise 10 0
D2 at 6 feet 0 10
Accuracy 100%
Predicted Noise D2 at 10 feet
Noise 10 o
D2 at 10 feet 0 10
Accuracy 100%
Table 5.6 Device Detection using NN
5.1.4 Neural Networks. NNs are the only passive detection technique 
cur-rently available in literature that is capable of both detecting and recognizing 
two or more sources of UEEs. Hence NN was selected as the model that will be 
used for comparing the results of proposed algorithms of this research for the 
purpose of validation. The performance of Neural Network in detecting UEEs is 
illustrated in table 5.6. We can observe in table 5.6 that the accuracy of NN in 
detecting UEEs is 100%.
5.2. RECOGNITION
For the purpose of this research, recognition is dened as the ability of the
three methods (PCA, HMM, and SVM) in recognizing and dierentiating UEEs
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from two dierent RF devices. This section will discuss the performance of these
three methods in recognizing UEE signals from two dierent sources based on the
experimental study discussed in Section 4.
5.2.1  Principal Components Analysis. Results of PCA analysis on Sec-tion 
5.1.1 showed that top PCs of UEE explain most of the variation in the dataset but in
case of noise, top PCs represent comparatively less variation in the dataset as
compared with UEEs. This property was used to dierentiate UEE signal from the
ambient noise. But if we closely observe the PCs on all devices, there is no pattern in
the PCs of devices that will help us dierentiate UEE sources from two dierent
devices.
PCs D1 - 3ft D2 - 3ft D1 - 6ft D2 - 6ft D1 - 10ft D2 - 10ft
2 80.23% 65.97% 73.39% 88.50% 82.49% 64.00%
5 98.19% 90.54% 96.36% 97.04% 97.75% 80.42%
10 99.82% 98.76% 99.77% 99.54% 99.84% 88.49%
Table 5.7 Total Variation Explained by top 2, 5, and 10 PCs of Two Devices
Table 5.7 illustrates the total variation explained by top 2, top 5, and top 10
PCs of two devices. At 3 feet, the contribution of PCs of D1 is greater than the
contribution of PCs of device D2 for all the three cases (i.e. top 2, top 5, and top 10
PCs). At 6 feet, the situation is reversed and the the contribution of PCs of D2 is
greater than the contribution of PCs of device D1 for all the three cases. The results
at 10 feet is similar to the results at 3 feet such that the contribution of PCs of D1
is greater than the contribution of PCs of device D2. These results shows that there
is no consistent pattern on the contribution of PCs of devices that can be used to
distinguish UEE from one device to another.
5.2.2 Hidden Markov Models. HMM can not only detect if there is 
a source of UEE present at a particular distance, but can also recognize between
two
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sources of UEEs. The performance of HMM in recognizing UEE is illustrated in
table 5.8. The recognition accuracy is 90% at 3 feet but the accuracy decreases as
the distance increases.
Predicted D1 at 3 feet D2 at 3 feet
D1 at 3 feet 8 0
D2 at 3 feet 2 10
Accuracy 90%
Predicted D1 at 6 feet D2 at 6 feet
D1 at 6 feet 5 1
D2 at 6 feet 5 9
Accuracy 70%
Predicted D1 at 10 feet D2 at 10 feet
D1 at 10 feet 8 2
D2 at 10 feet 2 8
Accuracy 80%
Table 5.8 Device Recognition using HMM
Test Device
Predicted D1 at 3 feet D2 at 3 feet
D1 at 3 feet 10 0
D2 at 3 feet 0 10
Accuracy 100%
Predicted D1 at 6 feet D2 at 6 feet
D1 at 6 feet 10 0
D2 at 6 feet 0 10
Accuracy 100%
Predicted D1 at 10 feet D2 at 10 feet
D1 at 10 feet 10 1
D2 at 10 feet 0 9
Accuracy 95%
Table 5.9 Device Recognition using SVM
5.2.3 Support Vector Machine. Pairwise comparison was performed 




Predicted D1 at 3 feet D2 at 3 feet
D1 at 3 feet 10 0
D2 at 3 feet 0 10
Accuracy 100%
Predicted D1 at 6 feet D2 at 6 feet
D1 at 6 feet 8 1
D2 at 6 feet 2 9
Accuracy 85%
Predicted D1 at 10 feet D2 at 10 feet
D1 at 10 feet 9 1
D2 at 10 feet 1 9
Accuracy 90%
Table 5.10 Device Recognition using NN
We can observe in table 2 that SVM can accurately identify between two devices at
three dierent distances. Pairwise comparison showed that the accuracy is 100% at 3
feet and 6 feet, and the accuracy is 95% at 10 feet. The decrease in accuracy can be
explained by the fact that the signal strength of the UEE decreases as the distance
between the devices emitting the signal increases.
5.2.4 Neural Networks.  The performance of NNs in recognizing between two 
sources of UEEs at three dierent distances is illustrated in Table 5.10. The accuracy 
is 100% at 3 feet and it decreases to 85% and 90% as the distance increases to 6 feet 
and 10 feet respectively. The accuracy of NNs is greater than the accuracy of HMM 
but is equal with the accuracy of SVM in detecting UEEs. NNs and SVM gave equal 
accuracy for detection, but the accuracy of SVM is greater than the accuracy of NNs 
for recognition.
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6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS
Current methods for detecting UEEs can be divided into two types: stimulated
detection and passive detection. Stimulated Detection is the method of detection
of UEEs where the underlying characteristics of UEE is strengthened and stabilized
by an external stimulation signal. The UEEs in the passive detection methods are
not tampered with and are analyzed in its raw form. Stimulated detection methods
suers from the following disadvantages:
1. Stimulated detection methods have only been used for detection, and not for
identication of devices
2. There is a work overload of creating and emitting the stimuli signals
3. Extensive characterization measurements of the target devices are required
4. Sometimes, there is a risk that the stimuli signal will interact with the device
with unwanted consequences. For example in IED detection, there is a risk
that the stimuli signal might detonate the explosive
Passive detection methods don't suer from these disadvantages, except the
third one where characterization of device is required to create the threshold value
that is used for deciding if the signal is UEE or noise. The challenge lies in the
fact that UEEs are low in power and are often buried deep in the noise band. This
research studied the performance of three methods, namely, PCA, HMM, and SVM
in the passive detection and recognition of UEEs.
It has been illustrated in Section 5 that PCA can be used to detect UEE from
noise but cannot be used to dierentiate between two sources of UEE. The reason for
this is that the contribution of top PCs of UEE explain most of the variation in data
whereas top PCs of noise explain less variation in data. Based on this information,
a decision table can be made as illustrated in Section 5.3 that can be used for UEE
detection.
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It was found that PCA is not capable of dierentiating two sources of UEE.
The dierence between the PCs of UEEs from two devices is not large enough such
that top PCs of one device could give extra information from the top PCs of another
device. The PCs of two devices at 3 feet, 6 feet, and 10 feet are similar with each other
and there is no specic pattern that can dierentiate between two similar sources of
UEEs.
HMMs can be used for both detection and recognition of UEEs. The accuracy
of HMM decreased as the distance of the source of UEE increased. The magnitude
of this decrease in accuracy was lower in device detection but considerably higher for
device recognition. As illustrated in Figure 4.11, both the detection and recognition
are performed by comparing the probability of a particular test signal being emitted
by a HMM. Comparison of the probability is made and the device (or noise) that
gives the greater probability is chosen. The dierence in probabilities of the test
signal between noise and UEE has a larger margin than the dierence in probabilities
between two UEE signal. As the margin of dierence in the probability value is small,
it is more likely that an incorrect HMM will be selected when comparing the UEEs
from two devices. Due to this reason, the accuracy of HMM decreases signicantly
during device recognition but performs satisfactorily for device detection.
The accuracy of NNs is greater than the accuracy of HMM but is equal with the
accuracy of SVM in detecting UEEs. There exists a signicant dierences between
noise and UEE signal for these two algorithm to create a boundary of separation that
perfectly separates UEE signal from noise. But in the case of recognizing between two
sources of UEE, SVM gave better performance than NNs. UEEs from two devices are
very similar with one another. The dierences in the characteristics of UEE signals
from two devices is very small as compared to the dierences in the characteristics
of noise and UEE signal. When the dierence in characteristic is larger, then the
separating hyperplane created by NN was good enough to correctly classify two
two classes of noise and UEE signal. In case of UEE signal from two devices, the
separating hyperplane of NNs may misclassify few data points as the separating
hyperplane of NNs are not optimal. But SVM creates an optimal hyperplane between
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the boundary of UEE signal from two devices. Due to this reason, the accuracy of
SVM is greater than the accuracy of NNs.
This research has advanced the eld of passive detection and recognition meth-
ods of UEE. Most of the current focus on UEE is on the costly stimulated detection
methods. This research has shown that less costly passive detection methods can
be used for UEE detection at short distances. Moreover, most of the current meth-
ods for UEE detection cannot separate between two sources of UEEs. The methods
explored in this research, with the exception of PCA, can not only detect but also
identify and recognize between two sources of UEEs.
The major limitation of this research is that the UEE data is just for two
devices and the UEEs are collected only for three dierent distances. It would be
interesting to study the performance of the methods employed in this research to a
wide range of RF devices such as cell phones and remote control devices including
car key and garage door openers. As the basic characteristics of UEEs are similar,
the methodology proposed in this research should be able to detect other RF devices.
The only dierence will be in determining the bandwidth where consistent UEEs are
produced for those devices. The training and testing procedure will be the same.
The decision table proposed in Section 5.3 can be constructed with more ac-
curacy if data from many devices are available with large number of observations.
Moreover, if data can be collected for a larger number of distances rather than just
three distances of 3 feet, 6 feet, and 10 feet, a thorough investigation can be performed
to determine the relationship between distance of UEE source and the accuracy of
each method. It will also enable to determine the critical distance for each method
beyond which the accuracy decreases signicantly and a particular method should
not be used for detection and recognition of UEEs.
The military has a need for an eective IED detection system. An IED detec-
tion system should perform the task of detection, localization, and the direction of
the malicious devices. This research was focused on the detection aspect of IED de-
tection system. It contributed to the IED detection system by proposing stochastic
and computational intelligence methods that can not only detect but also recog-
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nize between two sources of UEEs. Recognition ability enhances the performance of
UEE detection system by providing it with the capability of dierentiating malicious
sources of UEEs from the ones that are not malicious. NN is the only current passive
detection method that has recognition capability. This research also contributed to
the passive detection methods of UEE by proposing the application of HMM and
SVM, where SVM using radial basis function showed a better performance. Another
contribution of this research is in the application of PCA for UEE detection based
on the dierences between contribution of top principal components of UEE signal
and noise.
The rst natural extension to this work is to conduct applied research to im-
plement the IED detection system in a real world scenario. It would consist of im-
plementing the methods proposed in this research in relevant hardware and conduct
IED detection and recognition by collecting the leakage of electromagnetic signals
from RF devices in the form of UEEs. Another immediate extension to this research
would be to apply the three proposed algorithms for stimulated detection method.
Stimulated detection is nothing but increasing the intensity of the signal so that it
would be easier to detect the signal in the ambient noise. Detection and recognition
still has to be performed on the stimulated emission. This work will not only increase
the detection and recognition range, but will also increase the accuracy.
This research was focussed on the passive detection of low power signals. An
additional future work might be the study of performance of algorithms employed
in this research to detect and identify low power electromagnetic signals other than
UEEs.
APPENDIX A
A. Matlab Code for UEE Data Processing
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Matlab Code for UEE Data Processing
%%%This MATLAB program take s 40 t e x t f i l e s o f Unintended
Elec t romagnet i c Emissions
%%%as input , and performs the data proce s s ing t a s k s f o r HMM
close a l l ;
clear a l l ;
clc ;
warning o f f ;
%Def in ing no o f data s e t s to be used f o r t r a i n i n g in Baum 
Welch
n o t r a i n s e t = 30 ;%tra i n i n g s e t f o r Baum Welch
%Def in ing the number o f t r a i n i n g s e t
no t r a i n i n g s e t = 30 ;%Training s e t f o r e s t ima t ing TPM and EPM
%Def in ing v a r i a b l e s f o r ove r l ap and window s i z e
w s i z e = 100 ;%Window Si ze
over lap = 50 ;%Overlap S i z e
%Counter f o r i n t i a l i z i n g the windows
cWindow = 1 ;
%de f i n i n g range f o r windows f o r e s t ima t i on
rangeWindows = 9 : 1 1 ;
rangeForWindow = max( rangeWindows ) min( rangeWindows )+1;
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%de f i n i n g t h r e s h o l d f o r the purpose o f c a l c u l a t i n g the
%number o f peaks in each window
th r e sho ld = 1 .0 e 011  0 . 1 ;
%%%%%
%%%%%%
%C l a s s i f i c a t i o n c r i t e r i a f o r s t a t e s f o r the average power f o r
each o f the
%cen t r a l 3 windows where we have UEE
no s t a t e s = 4 ;
no obse rva t i on s = 5 ;
%i n t i a l i z i n g two c e l l arrays to s t o r e data in dB in wat t s%
ce l l dataWatt=c e l l ( 1 , 40 ) ;
c e l l dataDb = c e l l ( 1 , 40 ) ;
%i n t i a l i z i n g two c e l l arrays to dynamica l ly s t o r e data in dB
in wat t s%
dataDb = [ ] ;
dataWatt = [ ] ;
%To ge t a l l the dB data f i l e s in matlab workspace
%Please remember t ha t t h e r e shou ld be 40 t e x t f i l e s on the
same f o l d e r as
%t h i s matlab code
for i =1:40
s=[ ' load d ' int2str ( i ) ' . txt ' ] ;
eval ( s ) ;
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end ;
%Import ing data from workspace in t o the c e l l array f o r power
in dB
for i =1:40;
ce l l dataDb f i g = importdata ( sprintf ( 'd%d . txt ' , i ) ) ;
end
%Convert ing data from dB to watt by import ing i t f i r s t i n t o
% separa t e array . Af ter t ha t s t o r i n g i t to array o f wat t s and
pu t t i n g i t
% in to c e l l array f o r wat t s
for p=1:40;
dataDb=ce l l dataDb fp g ;
for q=1: length ( dataDb ) ;
dataWatt ( q ) = 10^(( dataDb (q ) 30)/10) ;
end
ce l l dataWatt fpg=dataWatt ;
end
%de f i n i n g array f o r dynamic assignment o f windows from 1001
data po in t s
dataWindow = [ ] ;
data ce l l w indow = [ ] ;
%Creat ing windows f o r each da t a s e t and pu t t i n g those windows
in the c e l l
%array crea t ed f o r windows
%Define one c e l l array f o r windows
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ce l l w indow = c e l l (40 ,1001) ;
%Access the f i r s t da t a s e t from c e l l o f arrays o f power in
wat t s
%i . e . c e l l w a t t and i n t i a l i z e the f i r s t window fo r f i r s t
da t a s e t
%i . e . c e l l w a t t f1g
dataWatt = ce l l dataWatt f1g ;
ce l l w indow f1 ,1g= dataWatt ( 1 : w s i z e ) ;
q=w s i z e ;
s=1;
while s<=40;
%I n t i a l i z i n g wi th f i r s t window
dataWatt = ce l l dataWatt f s g ;
c e l l w indow fs , 1g = dataWatt ( 1 : w s i z e ) ;
%Def in ing counter f o r wh i l e loop
%i n t i a l i z i n g counter f o r en t e r ing in t o the inner wh i l e
loop to c r ea t e
%19 windows f o r each 48 data s e t s
counter = 1 ;
%re i n t i a l i z i n g q to window s i z e f o r en t e r ing in t o the
inner wh i l e loop to c r ea t e
% 19 windows f o r each 48 data s e t s
q=w s i z e ;
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%r e i n t i a l i z i n g cWindow so t ha t i t s t a r t c r e a t i n g the
window form 2
%through 19 f o r each data s e t . f i r s t window i s a l r eady
i n t i a l i z e d above
%the s e i n t i a l i z a t i o n s
cWindow = 1 ;
%enter the wh i l e loop i f counter i f counter and q i s
l e s s than 952
while ( counter< length ( dataWatt ) + 1   over lap )&&(q< length (
dataWatt )+1  over lap )
%increment ing counter by 50 i . e . ove r l ap
counter=counter+over lap ;
%increment ing q by 50 i . e . ove r l ap
q=q+over lap ;
%increment ing cWindow by 1 to c r ea t e 19 windows
cWindow=cWindow+1;
%pu t t i n g data from dataWatt to each window
ce l l w indow fs , cWindowg= dataWatt ( counter : q ) ;
end ;




%ca l c u l a t i n g the maximum s i z e o f c e l l array to s t o r e data in
psd format
p s i z e = (max( rangeWindows ) ) ;
%de f i n i n g the c e l l array to s t o r e psd data
c e l l a v g p s d=c e l l (1 , p s i z e ) ;
c e l l p e a k p sd=c e l l (1 , p s i z e ) ;
%de f i n i n g an array f o r the data manipu lat ion form watt to psd
format
dataAvgPsd = [ ] ;
dataPeakPsd = [ ] ;
%running two f o r l oops . Outer loop f o r each 40 f i l e s
%inner f o r loop f o r windows in the range de f ined above
for i =1:40
for j=min( rangeWindows ) :max( rangeWindows )
%conver t ing data from watt to dspdata format
dataAvgPsd=dspdata . psd ( ce l l w indow f i , j g) ;
%ca l c u l a t i n g the average o f each window
c e l l a v g p s d f i , jg=avgpower ( dataAvgPsd ) 10^12;
%ca l c u l a t i n g the no o f peaks f o r each window above
t h r e s h o l d
c e l l p e a k p sd f i , j g = numel ( f indpeaks ( dataAvgPsd , '
minpeakheight ' , th r e sho ld ) ) ;
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%ending the inner f o r loop
end
%ending outr f o r loop
end ;
%Def in ing an array f o r i n t e rm id i a t e opera t i ons to append data
avg pow = [ ] ;
no peak win = [ ] ;
for i =1: n o t r a i n i n g s e t
for j=min( rangeWindows ) :max( rangeWindows )
avg pow append = c e l l a v g p s d f i , j g ;
avg pow = [ avg pow ; avg pow append ] ;
peak pow append = c e l l p e a k p sd f i , j g ;
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Matlab Code for PCA calucation of UEEs
%load ing UEE data
mydatada = load ( ueedata ) ;
%conver t ing the data from c e l l array format to array format
mynewdata = ce l l 2mat (mydatada ) ;
%reshap ing and tak ing t ranspose
mynewdata1 = reshape (mynewdata , 400 , 40) ;
mynewdata1 = mynewdata1 ' ;
%performing the p r i n c i p a l components us ing the Matlab
func t i on princomp
[ pc , score , l a t e n t ] = princomp (mynewdata1 ) ;
%pr i n t i n g the c on t r i b u t i on o f top 10 p r i n c i p a l components
lm = cumsum( l a t e n t ) . /sum( l a t e n t ) ;
lm ( 1 : 1 0 ) ;
%p l o t t i n g the p r i n c i p a l components
pareto ( l a t e n t )
pr inc ipa lname = f ' 1 s t ' , ' 2nd ' , ' 3 rd ' , ' 4 th ' , ' 5 th ' , ' 6 th ' , ' 7
th ' , ' 8 th ' , ' 9 th ' , ' 10 th ' g ;
xlabel ( ' P r i n c i p a l Components ' ) ;
ylabel ( ' Var ia t ion Explained by Pr i n c i pa l Components ' ) ;
t i t l e ( ' Device 1 at 3 f e e t ' ) ;
APPENDIX C
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R code for Baum Welch algorithm
# This R program computes the Baum Welch Algorithm us ing RHmm
package
#load sw3 datawatt t r a i n i n g data
myndata trainsw3 <  read . t ab l e (" sw3 avgpower 400 tra in . txt ")
myndata trainsw3 <  as . l i s t ( myndata trainsw3 )
#f i t the data with Baum Welch
sw3hmm <  HMMFit( myndata trainsw3 , nStates = 2)
#load sw3 t e s t i n g data
myndata testsw3 <  read . t ab l e (" sw3 avgpower 400 test . txt ")
myndata testsw3 <  as . l i s t ( myndata testsw3 )
# c a l c u l a t e the V i t e rb i path
VitPathsw3 <  v i t e r b i (sw3hmm, myndata testsw3 )
VitPathsw3$logProbSeq
APPENDIX D
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R code for Support Vector Machine
# R program for SVM using e1071 package
r e qu i r e ( e1071 )
r e qu i r e (R. matlab )
# import data in R
bw3 <  readMat (" comprehensive data bw30 .mat")
bw3 <  bw3 [ 1 ]
sw3 <  readMat (" comprehens ive data sw30 .mat")
sw3 <  sw3 [ 1 ]
#convert l i s t data to data frame
dbw3 <  data . frame ( matrix ( u n l i s t (bw3) , nrow=40, byrow=T) )
dsw3 <  data . frame ( matrix ( u n l i s t ( sw3 ) , nrow=40, byrow=T) )
# adding l a b e l to data set
dbw3$label <  'bw3 '
dsw3$labe l <  ' sw3 '
# merge data frame us ing 'merge '
traindbw3 <  dbw3 [ 1 : 3 0 , ]
testdbw3 <  dbw3 [ 3 1 : 4 0 , ]
tra indsw3 <  dsw3 [ 1 : 3 0 , ]
testdsw3 <  dsw3 [ 3 1 : 4 0 , ]
# combining t r a i n i n g data and t e s t data
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t r a i n l a b e l a l l <  rbind ( traindbw3 , tra indsw3 )
t e s t l a b e l a l l <  rbind ( testdbw3 , testdsw3 )
# sepa ra t ing the c l a s s l a b e l from t r a i n data
t ra indata <  subset ( t r a i n l a b e l a l l , s e l e c t =   l a b e l )
#t r a i n l a b e l <  subset ( t r a i n l a b e l a l l , s e l e c t = l a b e l )
t r a i n l a b e l <  t r a i n l a b e l a l l [ 1 : 6 0 , 7 ]
# sepa ra t ing the c l a s s l a b e l from t e s t data
t e s tda ta <  subset ( t e s t l a b e l a l l , s e l e c t =   l a b e l )
#t e s t l a b e l <  subset ( t e s t l a b e l a l l , s e l e c t = l a b e l )
t e s t l a b e l <  t e s t l a b e l a l l [ 1 : 2 0 , 7 ]
# conver t ing t r a i n i n g and t e s t i n g l a b e l to f a c t o r from data
frame
t r a i n l a b e l <  as . f a c t o r ( t r a i n l a b e l )
t e s t l a b e l <  as . f a c t o r ( t e s t l a b e l )
# t r a i n i n g the svm
mysvm <  svm( tra indata , t r a i n l a b e l )
#t e s t i n g the support vec to r machine
pred <  p r ed i c t (mysvm, t e s tda ta )
#check the accuracy o f the model
t ab l e ( pred , t e s t l a b e l )
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Data segment for D1 at 3 feet



























F. Data segment for D1 at 6 feet
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Data segment for D1 at 6 feet



























G. Data segment for D1 at 10 feet
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Data segment for D1 at 10 feet



























H. Data segment for D2 at 3 feet
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Data segment for D2 at 3 feet



























I. Data segment for D2 at 6 feet
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Data segment for D2 at 6 feet



























J. Data segment for D2 at 10 feet
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K. Data segment for Noise
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